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Constitutional Limitations on Anticompetitive
State and Local Solid Waste Management
Schemes: A New Frontier in Environmental
Regulation
Randall S. Abate t and Mark E. Bennettt
The enactment of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
and the expansion of the scope of interstate commerce have "nationalized"
solid waste management, a field that was formerly the exclusive domain of
state and local governments. Today, state and local governments act as both
sovereigns and market participants in the solid waste management context;
nonetheless, these entities may limit the role of private market participantsin
the solid waste managementfield only in a manner that does not obstruct the
Sherman Act's objectives. Abate and Bennett explore the limits that the
Sherman Act, the Commerce Clause, and the Supremacy Clause impose on
anticompetitive state and local solid waste management activities within the
framework of RCRA's regulatory scheme. The authors explain how the
"market participant"doctrine illuminates the nature of the interplay among
RCRA, the Sherman Act, and the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses and
argue that this doctrine may provide the missing analyticallink in resolving
questions in this new area of the law. The Article concludes that any
governmental entity held by a court to be acting as a market participantin a
solid waste management scheme should be subject to possible antitrust
liability for anticompetitive conduct. Such a rule would preclude such
entities from using the state action immunity doctrine to avoid dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny.
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Introduction
Historically, responsibility for solid waste collection and disposal has
rested exclusively with state and local governments. These waste management
activities have been conducted in the public interest pursuant to the states'
police power. The authority for such regulation arises out of the Tenth
Amendment,' which empowers the states to enact legislation to protect the
health, safety, morals, and general welfare of their citizens.
Since the enactment of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 (RCRA), however, solid waste collection and disposal have not been
purely local, intrastate activities. Under RCRA, Congress intended to engage
the federal and state governments in a cooperative relationship to achieve
national solid waste management goals. Waste management plans under
RCRA must comply with federal guidelines and be approved by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to qualify for federal funding and
technical assistance. The national interests embodied in RCRA indicate that
state and local solid waste management schemes implicate the Commerce
Clause.
1. The Tenth Amendment states: 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
2. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988).

Constitutional Limitations
This Article explores the limits that the Sherman Act,3 the Commerce
Clause, 4 and the Supremacy Clause 5 impose on anticompetitive state and
local solid waste management activities in the context of the "cooperative
federalism" '6 scheme contemplated under RCRA. The Supremacy Clause and
the antitrust policies of the Sherman Act require states to provide a role for
private market participants in the solid waste management field so as not to
obstruct the Sherman Act's objectives. In determining whether, and to what
extent, states may limit competition in the solid waste management market,
courts balance possible discrimination against interstate commerce imposed
by solid waste management schemes against the purely local state interest
advanced by the law or regulation.
The Article also examines the "state action immunity" doctrine
announced in Parkerv. Brown7 and its application to antitrust challenges to
state and local solid waste management schemes. The immunity accorded
anticompetitive state economic regulations in Parker was premised on state
sovereignty concerns. However, the post-Parker expansion of the scope of
interstate commerce, the rejection of the concept of "traditional" local
government functions, 8 and the identification of solid waste management as
an "article of interstate commerce" 9 warrant a reexamination of the validity of
state action immunity in the context of solid waste management. A
reconsideration of the continuing relevance of Parker as a doctrine for
antitrust claims in the solid waste management context must recognize 10that
the dormant Commerce Clause and antitrust preemption analyses overlap.
Nevertheless, in many cases in which some aspect of a state, county, or
municipal solid waste management scheme has been challenged, courts have
inappropriately separated their consideration of the constitutional issues from
3. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-41 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
4. The Commerce Clause states: "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes." U.S. CoNsT. art. 1,§ 8,cL 3.
5. The Supremacy Clause states: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S.
CONST. art. VI, § 2.
6. "Cooperative federalism" refers to Congress' authority to influence state legislation consistent with
federal policies by offering states the option to regulate private activity inaccordance with federal standards in
lieu of outright preemption by federal regulation. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 242324 (1992); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981). Cooperative federalism enables the federal government to
structure solutions to environmental problems through which compliance with federal standards is achieved by
financial and regulatory incentives to states.
7. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
8. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985) (rejecting as
"unsound in principle and unworkable in practice" principle of state immunity from federal regulation premised
on judicial interpretation of whether particular governmental function is "integral" or "traditional").
9. See C &A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
10. Construction Aggregate Transp., Inc. v. Florida Rock Indus., Inc., 710 F.2d 752, 766 (11 th Cir.
1983). See also United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 189 (1954) ("Wholly local
business restraints can produce the effects condemned by the Sherman Act."); Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees
of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976).
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their consideration of the antitrust issues. This separation has resulted in
judicial endorse mient of anticompetitive state and local regulations that
promote economic protectionism forbidden under the dormant Commerce
Clause. Typically, the courts' review has been limited to assessing the extent
to which a solid waste management scheme's regulation of interstate
commerce is constitutionally permissible under the dormant Commerce
Clause. Recently, however, private waste processors have challenged solid
waste management schemes, particularly "flow control"'1 laws, on antitrust
and constitutional grounds, contending that such schemes illegally interfere
with interstate commerce.
The pivotal case that sparked this recent trend is C & A Carbone, Inc. v.
Town of Clarkstown,1 2 in which the Supreme Court invalidated a flow control
regulation mandating that all garbage within a municipality be brought to a
particular private solid waste management facility. Since Carbone, federal
courts have in a number of cases been forced to determine how RCRA, the
Sherman Act, and the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses interact. The most
significant recent decisions dealing with this question are Pine Ridge
Recycling, Inc. v. Butts County, 13 Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling,
Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 14 and SSC Corp. v. Town of
Smithtown.15 Taken together, these decisions provide the framework for a
consistent and coherent approach to this new wave of environmental
litigation.
The "market participant" doctrine highlights the nature of the interplay
among RCRA, the Sherman Act, and the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses
and may provide the missing analytical link in resolving challenges to
anticompetitive state and local solid waste management schemes. The market
participant doctrine provides that state and local governments have a choice
between regulating as a sovereign and acting as a market participant. When
acting as a sovereign, state and local governments are shielded by antitrust
immunity, yet remain subject to the prohibitions of the dormant Commerce
Clause. As a market participant, state and local governments avoid Commerce
Clause claims but are subject to antitrust law. In the solid waste management
context, however, state and local governments often act as both sovereigns
and market participants. For instance, a privately operated solid waste
management facility may be purchased and run by the state after it is
financed, with the support of a flow control ordinance like the one in
11. The term "flow control" refers to the legal mechanisms used by local governments to designate
where municipal solid waste from a specified geographic area under the jurisdiction of the local government
must be managed, stored, or disposed. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown 114 S.Ct. 1677, 1680
(1994).
12. 114S.Ct. 1677(1994).
13. 855 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
14. 48 F.3d 701 (3d Cir. 1995).
15. 66 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 911 (1996).

Constitutional Limitations
Carbone. This Article argues that state and local governments should not be
allowed to enjoy antitrust immunity yet avoid scrutiny under the Carbone
Commerce Clause analysis.
Part I of this article discusses the role of RCRA and the Sherman Act in
regulating anticompetitive state and local solid waste management schemes.
Part H addresses the origin and development of the Parker state action
immunity doctrine, both within and outside the solid waste management
context, in light of the expansion of the scope of interstate commerce. Part m
considers the role of preemption and the Supremacy Clause and addresses the
overlap between the application of the Sherman Act and the dormant
Commerce Clause analysis in resolving these disputes. Part IV examines the
origin and development of the market participant doctrine, both within and
outside the solid waste management context, and explores the doctrine's role
in resolving challenges to anticompetitive state and local solid waste
management schemes. After analyzing the interplay among RCRA, the
Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and the Sherman Act, this Article
concludes that state and local governments should be precluded from using
the Parkerstate action immunity doctrine to regulate solid waste in a manner
that violates the dormant Commerce Clause while remaining insulated from
antitrust liability.
I.

The Federal Regulatory Context: RCRA, the Sherman Act, and
Anticompetitive Solid Waste Management Schemes

A. RCRA and CooperativeFederalism
The first federal effort to define "solid waste" and to address the
environmental problems associated with its disposal appeared in 1965 with
the passage of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA). 16 The SWDA was
primarily intended to promote research and to provide federal financing for
the study of environmentally sound methods of solid waste management.
However, few federal grant programs were actually pursued and, while
SWDA-sponsored research led to valuable data on 1waste
disposal, the
7
legislation is viewed as having been generally ineffective.
This first wave of federal legislation concerning solid waste did not
disturb the states' traditional control over solid waste management activities.
However, a growing awareness of the dangers that unsafe waste disposal
practices posed to human health and the environment prompted Congress to

16. Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 997, repealed by Pub. L. No. 94580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1995)).
17. See Note, Michigan Gets Trashed: The Effect of the Dormant Commerce Clause
on State
Attempts to Regulate Solid Waste Disposal,39 Wayne L. Rev. 1665, 1667 n. 18 (1993).
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enact RCRA in 1976.18 The enactment of this environmental legislation
signalled a departure from the tradition of deferring to the states' autonomy in
the solid waste management field.1 9
Throughout RCRA there are statements indicating that Congress
considers solid waste management to be a national problem. The Act
contemplates that state actions should be coordinated as part of a federal
environmental program. In the congressional findings section of RCRA,
Congress acknowledged that state, regional, and local agencies should
continue to bear primary responsibility for the collection and disposal of solid
waste. Nevertheless, Congress found that the problems of waste disposal are
national in scope and require federal action through financial and technical
assistance and leadership in the development, demonstration, and application
of new and improved methods and processes to reduce the amount of
waste
20
and provide for proper and economical solid waste disposal practices.
The objectives for state and regional solid waste plans described in
Subchapter IV of RCRA include developing and encouraging
environmentally sound solid waste disposal methods and utilizing recoverable
energy resources from solid waste. Importantly, the statute contemplates
private business participation in the pursuit of these objectives, which are to
be achieved through federal assistance to states or regional authorities for
comprehensive planning in accordance with federal guidelines designed to
promote cooperation among federal, state, and local governments and private
industry. 21 State and local activities in solid waste planning and management
independent of RCRA are permissible, but
must be consistent with the state
22
plan approved by the EPA Administrator.
Its comprehensive regulatory scheme makes RCRA a benchmark in the
history of solid waste regulation. Despite the discretion afforded to states as to
whether to submit plans for federal approval in return for assistance, all state
activities in solid waste management are now subsumed within a federal
program with national environmental objectives. In addition, the statute
provides for the continued involvement of the private sector in solid waste
activities.
18.

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as

amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1995)).
19. RCRA defines "solid waste" as:

[Any garbage, refuse, sludge from awaste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution
control facility and other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous
material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining and agricultural operations, and from community
activities, but does not include solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved
materals in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges which are point sources subject to permits
under section 1342 of title 33 [Clean Water Act] or source, special nuclear, or byproduct material as
defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 923) [42 U.S.C. §§ 2011] et. seq.
42 U.S.C. § 6903.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 6941.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 6947(c).

Constitutional Limitations
Nevertheless, tension between federal and state interests in solid waste
management has prompted a wave of Commerce Clause challenges to waste
management schemes in the 1990s. 2 3 The Commerce Clause prohibits the
states from unjustifiably discriminating against or burdening the interstate
flow of commerce. 24 Once a law's effect on interstate commerce is
established, there are two lines of inquiry: first, whether the law discriminates
against interstate commerce under City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey; and
second, whether the law imposes a burden on interstate commerce that is
"clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." 25 As long as a
state does not discriminate against nonresidents, it may impose incidental
burdens on interstate commerce when exercising its police power to promote
safety or the general welfare.26
B. The Sherman Act: Commerce Clause Underpinnings and Congressional
Intent
The Sherman Act reflects Congress' determination that economic
efficiency and national solidarity are related. Like RCRA, the Sherman Act's
procompetitive mandate is national in scope; anticompetitive actions
affecting interstate commerce implicate both the Supremacy Clause and the
Commerce Clause.
Anticompetitive burdens on interstate commerce frustrate the national
free market goals of the Sherman Act. Because commerce is an area of shared
power, courts must determine when the national economic interest in
competition preempts anticompetitive state and local regulation. In some
cases, the issue of whether the Sherman Act preempts state anticompetitive
regulation is not even raised. Some litigants apparently presume that state

23. These challenges typically have involved one of three types of waste management: import/export
bans, see, for example, Fort Gratiot Landfill v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992);
tipping feeschemes, see, for example, Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992); or flow
control laws, see, for example, C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
24. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 1349 (1994).
25. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1682 (1994) (quoting City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)). See also Pie v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,

142(1970).
26. New York State Trawlers Ass'n v. Jorling, 16 F.3d 1303, 1307 (2d Cir. 1994). See also National
Solid Waste Management Ass'n v. Williams, 877 F. Supp. 1367, 1376 (D. Minn. 1995) (invalidating flow
control element of Minnesota's solid waste management statute requiring "arrangers" who transport
metropolitan waste to out-of-state landfills to make trust fund payments and to indemnify waste generators).
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statutes that explicitly (or implicitly 27) displace competition with regulation in
the solid waste market are immune from judicial scrutiny.28
To survive challenges to a court's subject matter jurisdiction, antitrust
plaintiffs must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct involves interstate
commerce. 29 Some courts have framed the jurisdictional inquiry for antitrust
claims in terms of whether Congress may prohibit the challenged conduct
under the Commerce Clause. If Congress may do so, then the conduct is
deemed to be within the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act.3 °
Congressional debate in 1890 over the Sherman Act concerned an issue
that remains controversial: the nature and extent of the states' police power
with respect to matters concerning commerce. Senator Edmunds, who drafted
the language addressing the Act's relation to commerce, asserted that the
Constitution did not authorize Congress "to enter into the police regulations
of the people of the United States." 3' Senator Vest maintained that the
legislation was unconstitutional, asserting "[t]he police power of the State is
an entirely different jurisdiction, as distinct and separate from the interstatecommerce
clause in the Federal Constitution as any two subjects can possibly
32
be.

,

Despite the limited view of federal Commerce Clause authority that some
members of Congress espoused, the final language of the Act and its farreaching national economic goals demonstrate its expansive scope. In
interpreting the language, the Supreme Court in City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co. stated: "Language more comprehensive is
difficult to conceive. On its face it shows a carefully studied attempt to bring
within the Act every person engaged in business whose activities
might
33
restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among the states."
The consensus among courts reviewing the Sherman Act's legislative
history has been that Congress intended "to establish a regime of competition
27. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 499 U.S. 365, 372 (1991) (state statute does
not need to "explicitly permit ... displacement of competition"); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471
U.S. 34, 42-43 (1985) ("It is not necessary... for the state legislature to have stated explicitly that it expected
the City to engage in conduct that would have anticompetitive effects" so long as such effects would
"logically' or "foreseeably" result.).
28. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1699 (1994) (preemption
issue never addressed by Court even though the "flow control ordinance at issue here squelches competition in
the waste-processing service altogether").
29. See Valley Disposal, Inc. v. Central Vermont Solid Waste Management Dist., 31 F.3d 89, 95 (2d
Cir. 1994) (landfill operators failed to allege sufficient facts indicating activities of defendant solid waste
management district had "not insubstantial" effect on interstate commerce as component of Sherman Act
jurisdiction).
30. See, e.g., Chatham Condominium Ass'ns v. Century Village, Inc., 597 F.2d 1002, 1008 (5th Cir.
1979).
31. 21 CONG. REc. 2727 (1890) (statement of Sen. Edmunds).
32. 21 CONG. REC. 2603 (1890) (statement of Sen. Vest).
33. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978) (quoting United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944)).

Constitutional Limitations
as the fundamental principle governing commerce in this country." 34 For
example, in dismissing the municipality's argument in Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder that the Court's denial of antitrust
immunity would have "adverse consequences" for cities, Justice Brennan
stated that the argument was merely "an attack upon the wisdom of the
longstanding congressional commitment to the policy of free markets and
open competition embodied in the antitrust laws." 35 To support his response,
Justice Brennan relied on Justice Marshall's eloquent explanation of the
stature of the antitrust laws:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the
Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the
preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as
the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal
freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no
matter how small, is the freedom to compete-to assert with vigor,
imagination,36 devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it
can muster.
HI. Parker and the Development of the State Action Immunity Doctrine
The Supreme Court's decision in Parker blurred the scope of permissible
anticompetitive state action under the Sherman Act. By failing to place its
federalism analysis of the Sherman Act in the proper historical context, the
ParkerCourt finessed the obvious conflict between anticompetitive state laws
and the procompetitive mandate of the Sherman Act. The Parker Court's
deference to state economic regulation ignored the fact that Congress
exercised all the powers it thought constitutionally permissible when it
enacted the Sherman Act, and that further applications of the Act, given its
broad language and goals, should account for the judicial evolution of
interstate commerce and the constitutional reach of the Commerce Clause.
A. The ParkerDecision
In 1943, the Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in Parker v.
Brown 37 concerning the applicability of the antitrust provisions of the
Sherman Act to a state law that had created a cartel-like state administrative
framework to orchestrate price and commodity distribution controls in the
California raisin market. The outcome of the decision was deceptively
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 56 (1982) (footnote omitted).
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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simple-the Court held that the antitrust prohibitions of the Sherman Act do
not apply to statutes enacted by states acting in their sovereign capacity. The
Court determined that, in the absence of any express congressional intent to
the contrary, a state is free to exercise its sovereign regulatory authority. The
Court rationalized the resulting conflict between the California law at issue
and federal law as an unavoidable aspect of federalism. The Parker Court's
decision did not refer to the Supremacy Clause; its holding was limited to the
conclusion that the Sherman Act did not prohibit an "act of government."
Subsequent cases have interpreted Parkeras announcing a "doctrine" of
either a "state action exemption" or "state action immunity." Both labels are
misnomers, and their continued use reflects the analytical shortcomings that
have distracted courts from establishing a constitutionally sound basis for
determining whether, or under what circumstances, the Sherman Act
preempts anticompetitive state regulation. The Parker decision launched
courts and commentators into a constitutional debate that goes to the very
foundation of our governmental system-the proper balance between federal
and state authority, and how to achieve it.
38
The Parker decision concerned the California Agricultural Prorate Act.
The Act authorized the "establishment, through action of state officials, of
programs for the marketing of agricultural commodities produced in the state,
so as to restrict competition among the growers and maintain prices in the
distribution of their commodities to packers. '39 The express purposes of the
Act were to "conserve the agricultural wealth of the State" and to "prevent
economic waste in the marketing of agricultural crops.'"4° The effects of the
Act were to restrict output and inflate prices.
The plaintiff, Porter L. Brown, a producer and packer of raisins in
California, sued the State Director of Agriculture, the members of the State
Agricultural Prorate Advisory Committee, and the Program Committee.
Brown sought an injunction based on alleged violations of the Sherman Act
and the Commerce Clause; however, the Court dismissed all of his claims.
The Court's treatment of Brown's Commerce Clause claim provides
some insight into the judicial mindset involved in the Sherman Act question
at issue in Parker,particularly with respect to the Court's understanding of
the scope of interstate commerce and its relationship to the states' police
power. The Court held that subjecting Brown to the output and price controls
set by the government-sponsored cartel did not violate the Commerce Clause,
even though the commodity (raisins) was to be packed and shipped out of
state. The Court reasoned that the "governments of the states are sovereign
within their territory save only as they are subject to the prohibitions of the
Constitution or as their action in some measure conflicts with powers
38. California Agricultural Prorate Act, Cal. Food & Agric. Code §§ 59641-59620 (West 1986).
39. Parker, 317 U.S. at 346.
40. Id.

Constitutional Limitations
delegated to the National Government, or with Congressional legislation
enacted in the exercise of those powers. '4 t
The Court then articulated the dormant Commerce Clause principle that
the grant of power to the federal government in the Commerce Clause "did
not wholly withdraw from the states the authority to regulate the commerce
with respect to matters of local concern, on which Congress has not
spoken. 4 2 The Court determined that state-administered price and output
controls are purely intrastate in nature, even though the commodity involved
was destined for interstate shipment.
There are two fundamental constitutional doctrines embedded in the
Parker Court's discussion of the Sherman Act issue: (1) intergovernmental
comity, and (2) state sovereign immunity. 43 The Court began its discussion by
assuming that California's prorate program "would violate the Sherman Act if
it were organized and made effective solely by virtue of a contract,
combination or conspiracy of private persons, individual or corporate." The
Court also made it clear that it was not addressing a "question of the state or
its municipality becoming a participant in a private agreement or combination
by others for restraint of trade." Apparently, the existence of a technical
44
Sherman Act violation by the state was irrelevant to the Court's analysis.
The Court noted that the individual actions-which it assumed violated
the Sherman Act-were made possible by the "legislative command of the
state. 4 5 It then determined that the language of the Sherman Act and its
legislative history lacked any indication that the Act was designed to "restrain
a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature.4 6
In what amounts to little more than a basic statement of federalism, the
Court further noted that "[iun a dual system of government in which, under
the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may
constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to
nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be
attributed to Congress. 4 7 This passage has served to misdirect courts in a
41. Id. at 359-60.
42. Id. at 360.
43. The Commerce Clause was the original focus of the case, and the basis for the lower court's
opinion. The Sherman Act issue was not addressed until the case reached the Supreme Court. The Court raised
the question sua sponte and requested supplemental briefs. The Justice Department, appearing as amicus
curiae, argued that the Sherman Act preempted California's prorate program, because the statute was
"designed directly to control the competitive aspects of an industry in a manner which will have more than local

effect." See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 64-65, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (No.
41-1040). This position is consistent with the preemption analysis discussed in Part lH.
44. Parker,317 U.S. at 350-52. A subsequent Supreme Court case, however, relying on "traditional
antitrust analysis" held that the Sherman Act did not preempt a municipality's rent control law imposing rent

ceilings because it was a "unilateral" governmental action. Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986). By
inserting "traditional antitrust analysis" as a threshold inquiry, the Court added a step not present in Parkerand

avoided the Supremacy Clause inquiry of whether government actions displacing competition conflict with the
Sherman Act. The Court did not consider whether the anticompetitive effect resulted from "state action."
45.
46.
47.

Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,350 (1943).
Id.at350-51.
Id. at 351.
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series of subsequent cases. The Court's belief that for there to be preemption
it must find an express statement concerning the applicability of the antitrust
laws to the states in the Sherman Act or its legislative history vitiates the
Supremacy Clause.4 8

The Court's deference to California's sovereign right to regulate the
economic activity occurring within its borders based on the state's police
power suggests a purely jurisdictional approach. The Court, however, waffled
on this issue, stating that "[tlhe regulation is thus applied to transactions
wholly intrastate before the raisins are ready for shipment in interstate
commerce." 49 On the other hand, when discussing the Sherman Act issue, the
Court stated that it "may assume also, without deciding, that Congress could,
in the exercise of its commerce power, prohibit a state from maintaining a
stabilization 50program like the present one because of its effect on interstate
commerce."
The Court was at its clearest, however, in stating that this immunity was
to be enjoyed solely by the state. Writing for a plurality of the Court some
twenty-three years later in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 51 Justice Stevens
observed that, in Parker,Chief Justice Stone carefully selected language that
limited the Court's holding to official action taken by state officials. 5 2 Justice
Stevens noted that the Parkeropinion contains thirteen references to the fact
that state action is involved.
It is precisely this interplay of public and private action that has, with few
exceptions, been at the heart of every Supreme Court case addressing the state
action immunity dilemma. 53 State economic regulations inevitably have a
direct effect on private individuals and corporations. Indeed, such is the
nature and purpose of governmental regulatory activity.
The flaw in the ParkerCourt's reasoning is that the Court's analysis was
limited to examining the Sherman Act's legislative history to determine
whether Congress intended to subject states to the antitrust laws. However,
the operation of the Supremacy Clause is not necessarily determined by the
express statutory language itself, but rather by whether the state and federal
laws conflict, 54 as where "compliance with both federal and state regulations
48.

See Gregory Werden & Thomas Balmer, ConflictsBetween State Law and the Sherman Act, 44 U.

Prrr. L.REv. 1,14 (1982) ("It is not at all clear why the Sherman Act was not held to preclude enforcement of
the California raisin program. No case interpreting the Supremacy Clause was cited by the Court to support its
reasoning, nor was any case distinguished from the instant one.").
49. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,361 (1943).
50. Id. at 350.
51. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
52. Id. at 591.
53. As Justice Stevens noted in Cantor,"typically cases of this kind involve a blend of private and
public decisionmaking." Id. at 592.
54. The preemption analysis is not merely formulaic, however, because absent express or implied
preemption, the balancing test discussed in Part m is indispensable in determining whether a state statute
conflicts with, or is an obstacle to the accomplishment of, federal law. Thus, the examination of congressional
intent, though informative, is only the beginning of the inquiry in many cases.
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is a physical impossibility," 55 or where the state law "stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." 56 The Court in Parker improperly relied on Northern Securities
Company v. United States,57 a case decided 39 years prior to Parker, to
support its statement that a state cannot authorize violations of the Sherman
Act.
Despite the language in Parkerlimiting antitrust immunity to states in the
exercise of their sovereign regulatory authority, private parties and other
governmental entities facing antitrust claims have invoked the Parker state
action immunity doctrine. Because "it would be unacceptable ever to impose
statutory liability on a party who had done nothing more than obey a state
command," 58 and since Parker and Northern Securities prohibited a state
from authorizing Sherman Act violations, the specter of crippling the states'
authority to enforce economic regulations resulted in the inevitable expansion
of state action immunity.
B. The Post-ParkerDevelopment of the State Action Immunity Doctrine
Fears that subjecting the states to the antitrust laws would virtually
preclude them from engaging in economic regulation contributed to the
courts' reluctance to apply the Supremacy Clause strictly to anticompetitive
state actions that conflict with the national economic policy embodied in the
Sherman Act. 59 The Court's approach has been to formulate a test to
determine whether an activity challenged as violative of the antitrust laws
qualifies as "state action." Generally, the outcome will depend on whether a
private party or political subdivision exercised sufficient decisionmaking
authority to enable the Court to conclude that 60such a party should be held
responsible for the consequences of its decision.
1. Antitrust Immunity for Municipalities
The Court opened the door for state action immunity for municipalities in
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.61 The Court held that two
55. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
56. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
57. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 346 (1904) ("It cannot be said that any State
may give a corporation, created under its laws, authority to restrain interstate or international commerce
against the will of the nation as lawfully expressed by Congress.").
58. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 592 (1976).
59. The Supreme Court has issued inconsistent decisions on this issue. Compare Cantor, 428 U.S. at
595 (stating that "[a]ll economic regulation does not necessarily suppress competition") with Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978) (stating that "[i]f an adverse effect on competition were, in
and of itself, enough to render a state statute invalid, the States' power to engage in economic regulation
would be effectively destroyed").
60. Cantor,428 U.S. at 593.
61. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
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municipalities operating electric utilities were not immune from an antitrust
claim based on their conditioning the provision of gas and water service on a
customer's purchase of the municipalities' electricity. The municipalities
argued that they were entitled to Parkerimmunity by virtue of their status as
government entities.
The Court in City of Lafayette was concerned about the serious economic
dislocation that could occur if cities were free to place their own parochial
62
interests above the nation's economic goals as reflected in the antitrust laws.
The Court determined that a municipality is entitled to state action immunity
when acting pursuant to a state policy requiring the anticompetitive restraint
as part of a comprehensive regulatory system that is: (1) "clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed"
as state policy; and (2) "actively supervised" by
63
the State Supreme Court.
Although the language for the two-prong test first appeared in City of
Lafayette, the Court's decision in California Retail Liquor Dealers
Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.64 is viewed as firmly establishing the
test. In Midcal, the Court denied antitrust immunity where a state statute
required wine wholesalers to charge prices dictated by the producers. The
arrangement was held to be an illegal resale price maintenance scheme that,
while "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" as a state policy, failed
to include sufficient state supervision to satisfy the second prong of the test.
The state action was limited to authorizing the price setting and enforcing the
prices established by private parties. The state did not establish the prices,
review them to ensure that they were reasonable, or oversee the terms of the
contracts between the producers and the wholesalers. Accordingly, the Court
held that there was insufficient "active state supervision" to satisfy the second
prong of the test.
Midcal best exemplifies a case where "notwithstanding the state
participation in the decision, the private party exercised sufficient freedom of
choice to enable the Court to conclude that he should be held responsible for
the consequences of his decision." 65 Seeking to ensure that regulatory
decisions with anticompetitive consequences remain in the hands of those
officially entrusted with the public interest, the Court stated: "The national
policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy

62. Id. at412-13.
63. Id. at 410.
64. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
65. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 49, 593 (1976). Compare Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) (invalidating state statute requiring nonsignatories to resale price
contracts to join state-approved, private price fixing
cartel) with New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,
439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978) (finding no impermissible delegation of state power to private citizens where state
statute required car manufacturers to obtain approval from state board before opening new dealership in
existing franchisee's market area if competing franchisee objected).
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cloak of state66involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing
arrangement.
While the Court has maintained relatively strict standards for private
parties seeking to come under the state action umbrella, it has significantly
relaxed its application of the two-prong test in City of Lafayette to assertions
of antitrust immunity by municipalities.6 7 To obtain state action immunity, a
municipality does not have to show that the state statute on which its actions
are based "explicitly permit[s] the displacement of competition." 68 Nor is it
necessary "for the state legislature to have stated explicitly that it expected the
City to engage in conduct that would have anticompetitive
effects," so long as
69
such effects would "logically" or "foreseeably" result.
Similarly, in distinguishing the standard for private parties from that
required for municipalities with respect to the "active state supervision"
element of the two-prong test, the Court observed that it "may presume,
absent a showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts in the public
interest. '70 The Court's rationale was that "[a]mong other things, municipal
conduct is invariably
more likely to be exposed to public scrutiny than is
7
private conduct.",

1

2. Municipal Antitrust Immunity in the Solid Waste Management
Context
Challenges to a state or municipality's regulation of solid waste collection
and processing were made easier to defend in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire72 through the relaxation of the two-prong test. In Town of Hallie, the
court held that so long as the displacement of competition in the solid waste
market is a "foreseeable result" of state enabling legislation, local
governments may employ anticompetitive means to achieve their
objectives,
73
even though the state does not actively supervise the programs.
Courts have reached conflicting results when applying the Town of Hallie
standard in situations where the state has delegated authority to political
subdivisions to adopt solid waste management programs. 74 However, a
municipality's adoption of anticompetitive measures for the express purpose
66.
67.

California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980).
See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 499 U.S. 365 (1991); Town of Halie v. City

of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
68. City of Columbia, 499 U.S. at 372.
69. Town of Haltie, 471 U.S. at 42-43.
70. Id.at45.
71. d at 45 & n.9.

72. Idat 34.
73. d at 42.
74. Compare Pine Ridge Recycling, Inc. v. Butts County, 855 F. Supp. 1264, 1271 (M.D. Ga. 1994)
(municipal defendants not entitled to state action immunity because state cannot grant its local governments
authority to violate Commerce Clause) ith
Bonollo Rubbish Removal, Inc. v. Town of Franklin, 886 F. Supp.
955, 962-65 (D. Mass. 1995) (municipal defendants immune from antitrust liability in challenge to town law
requiring haulers to deliver waste to designated waste management facility).
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of financing a waste management program, such as in Central Iowa Refuse
Systems, Inc. v. Des Moines Metro Solid Waste Agency7 5 and Hybud
Equipment
Corp. v. City of Akron, 76 is presumptively invalid under
77
Carbone.

Antitrust immunity for solid waste management regulation by counties
has also been addressed by the courts. In Ben Oehrleins & Sons & Daughter,
Inc. v. Hennepin County,78 a challenge was brought under the Sherman Act
and state antitrust law to a county ordinance that required solid waste within
the county to be disposed of at a particular incinerator. The court held that the
state action immunity doctrine shielded the county from liability for its
allegedly anticompetitive conduct. 79 The legislative scheme authorized the
county to require that all or any portion of the solid waste generated within its
borders be delivered to a designated disposal facility. Thus, the court
concluded, the scheme evidenced a "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed" state policy to "displace competition with regulation in the area of
municipal provision of solid waste disposal services." 80
I1. Preemption, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and Anticompetitive Solid
Waste Management Schemes
The doctrine of preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause.81 In the
earliest judicial pronouncement on this constitutional provision, Chief Justice
Marshall stated that the Supremacy Clause's import is that "[t]he States have
no power, by taxation, or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any
manner control the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress,
to carry into effect the powers vested in the national government., 8 2 Despite
the constitutional requirements embodied in the Supremacy Clause, the
Parker doctrine has protected state anticompetitive economic regulations
under the guise of seeking to ensure state sovereignty over matters of local
concern.
75. 715 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1983) (upholding as immune from antitrust liability monopoly over local
disposal).
76. 742 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1984) (upholding as immune from antitrust liability municipal waste
disposal monopoly over waste generated within its borders that employed a private contractor to build and
operate a designated waste management facility).
77. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677 1684 (1994) ("By itself, of course,
revenue generation is not a local interest that can justify discrimination against interstate commerce.").
78. Ben Oehrleins & Sons & Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin County, 867 F. Supp. 1430 (D. Minn. 1994).
79. 1d at 1436.
80. Id

81.

There are conceptual distinctions between the constitutional bases for, and operation of,

"preemption" and "supremacy." Supremacy means that valid federal law overrides otherwise valid state law,
whereas preemption occurs when states are deprived of their power to act at all in a given area, regardless of
conflict. Thus, preemption is "jurisdiction-stripping," whereas supremacy is "conflict-resolving." See Stephen
A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption,79 CORNEIL L. REv. 767, 770 (1994).
82. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 317 (1819).

Constitutional Limitations
A. The ConstitutionalDynamics of Preemption
Applying the Supremacy Clause is difficult in cases involving
commercial regulation because such regulation is an area of shared or
overlapping power. Therefore, the polestar for supremacy questions
concerning commercial regulation matters is the extent to which the subject
of the action is a matter of national concern requiring uniformity.
There are three ways in which federal law may preempt state law.83 First,
and easiest to apply, is where Congress expressly defines the extent to which
state law is preempted. 84 Second, there may be a "scheme of federal
regulation ...so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress
left no room for the States to supplement it." 85 Finally, even when Congress
has not completely displaced state regulation, state law is preempted to the
extent that it conflicts with federal law, as where "compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility," 86 or where the state
law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full
87
purposes and objectives of Congress."
The analysis of whether and when the Sherman Act preempts
anticompetitive state regulations falls into the last category-whether state
economic regulations displacing competition create an "obstacle" to the
accomplishment of the procompetitive purposes of the Sherman Act.
Congress did not believe that it could expressly subject the states to the
Sherman Act's antitrust prohibitions. What is certain, however, is that
Congress intended to promote the procompetitive objectives of the
legislation
88
to the fullest extent allowable under its Commerce Clause power.
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause and Conflict Preemption
One of the main problems with Parkerand its progeny is the confusion
between "exemptions" from statutory mandates-enacted by the same
sovereign-and preemption. As Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissenting
opinion in Community Communications:
83. Typically, cases reviewing a preemption claim begin with an overview of the categories of federal
preemption, which are essentially boilerplate statements of law. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501
U.S. 597 (1991); Michigan Canners & Freezers v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461 (1984).
84. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95-96 (1983); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519, 525 (1977).
85. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
86. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
87. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67 (1941).
88. In interpreting the reach of the Federal Arbitration Act under the Commerce Clause, Justice
Breyer, writing for the majority, observed that "it is not unusual for this Court... to ask whether the scope of
a statute should expand along with the expansion of the Commerce Clause power itself, and to answer the
question affirmatively-as, for the reasons set forth above, we do here." Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson,
115 S. Ct. 834, 840 (1995). See also Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2
(1976) (observing that Congress intended reach of Sherman Act to expand with expansion of Commerce
Clause power).
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The question addressed in Parker ... is not whether state and local
governments are exempt from the Sherman Act, but whether statutes,
ordinances, and regulations enacted as an act of government are preempted by the Sherman Act under the operation of the Supremacy
Clause... questions involving the so-called "state action" doctrine are
more properly framed as being ones of pre-emption rather than
9
exemption.
When a court conducts a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, a
determination that an anticompetitive state economic regulation violates the
Commerce Clause on the basis of preemption supersedes the Parker state
sovereignty premise. Subjecting private solid waste activities to
anticompetitive state or local regulatory measures transcends political and
geographical boundaries, thereby colliding with the national economic
interest in free markets and open competition.
Because of the nature of congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause, the dormant Commerce Clause analysis has significant implications
for preemption doctrine. Congress engages its preemption power to ensure
uniformity within a given area of regulation. When a state displaces
competition with regulation in an area of interstate commerce-such as the
solid waste management field-the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses
dovetail and provide a basis for a test to determine whether the state action is
an obstacle to the antitrust laws. A judicial determination that a state
regulation imposes a constitutionally impermissible burden on, or
discriminates against, interstate commerce supports the conclusion that it
conflicts with, and therefore is preempted by, the federal antitrust laws. State
economic regulations incidentally burden interstate commerce only when they
address purely local interests. However, the federal definition of solid waste
as a national problem in RCRA and the judicial determination that solid
waste activities amount to interstate commerce render state anticompetitive
regulations inherently protectionist.
Unlike express or implied preemption, conflict preemption requires
balancing. This balancing is undertaken to determine whether an alleged
conflict frustrates the purposes of federal law. Only then does the state action
become constitutionally impermissible. The strict scrutiny warranted by the
protectionist nature of state anticompetitive regulations requires more than
mere balancing, however. In this context, if the state's objective can be
achieved by means that do not require or result in the elimination of
competition, it violates the Commerce Clause and is therefore preempted.
State economic regulation of purely intrastate matters, which do not

89. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 60-62 (1982) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
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"substantially affect" interstate commerce, 90 will not be subject to judicial
review because a court will not have subject matter jurisdiction under such
circumstances.
In his concurring opinion in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 91 Justice
Blackmun stated that, while the Sherman Act "generally preempts"
inconsistent state laws, "the more difficult question [is] which such laws are
pre-empted and to what extent.",92 Justice Blackmun urged the adoption of a
balancing test, observing that the Court is constitutionally bound to balance
a view to assuring that when these
implicated federal and state interest, "with
93
are truly in conflict, the former prevail.,
Justice Blackmun described this balancing process as a "familiar one to
the federal courts," noting that a state action that interferes with competition
among the States is already subject to a similar balancing process under the
Commerce Clause. 94 Unfortunately, incorporating the balancing of federal
and state interests that has traditionally been performed in dormant
Commerce Clause cases into preemption analysis raises the specter of
Lochner95 and substantive due process. To permit such balancing could
involve the courts "in the same wide-ranging, essentially standardless inquiry
into the 96
reasonableness of local regulation that this Court has properly
rejected."
However, the Supreme Court's consideration of the preemption of state
economic regulation in the few cases in which it has been explicitly presented
suggests that fears of far-reaching and intrusive Lochner-type judicial review
are unfounded. For example, in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,97 the
Court held that a Maryland statute prohibiting oil producers and refiners from
operating retail gas stations in the state, and requiring that all temporary price
reductions be extended uniformly to all service stations, was reasonably
related to the state's legitimate purpose of controlling its gasoline market. In
addition to holding that the statute did not discriminate or otherwise
impermissibly burden interstate commerce, the Court rejected the contention
that no state can regulate retail marketing of gasoline because the economic
market for petroleum products is national in scope.
While the Court in Exxon determined that the Commerce Clause, by its
own force, did not preempt the field of retail gasoline marketing, it noted that
90. See McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980) (observing that Sherman Act was
designed to reach activities that "while wholly local in nature, nevertheless substantially affect interstate
commerce").

91. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
92. Id. at 609.
93. Id at 611.
94. Id. at 612. See also Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
95. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
96. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 67 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). See also City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 438-41 (1978)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
97. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
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when a lack of uniformity would impede the flow of goods, "the Commerce
Clause acts as a limitation upon state power even without congressional
implementation." 98 Without expressly acknowledging it, the Court's
discussion confirms the dovetailing of the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses
upon which the balancing test is based.
The Exxon Court also rejected the argument that Maryland's statute
"undermined" the competitive balance struck in the antitrust laws. In oftquoted language, the Court noted the statute's "anticompetitive effect," but
stated:
[T]his sort of conflict cannot itself constitute a sufficient reason for
invalidating the Maryland statute. For if an adverse effect on
competition were, in 'and of itself, enough to render a state statute
invalid, the States' power to engage in economic regulation would be
effectively destroyed. 99
Cases addressing whether a particular state economic regulation conflicts
with the Sherman Act are invariably placed within the "state action"
analytical context set forth in Parker.1°° Therefore, there is no weighing of
interests or consideration of alternative means as in dormant Commerce
Clause cases, and the outcomes are not expressed in terms of whether the
federal objective of free markets for our national economy override the state
interest in its economic regulation.
Similarly, cases in the solid waste management context have been
characterized by a dormant Commerce Clause analysis independent of the
question of preemption. However, in Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling,
Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders,1 °' the court observed that "[t]he parties
have not advanced either a preemption or authorization argument ... and we
further."' 10 2

decline to examine the issue

98. Id. at 128 (quoting Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n., 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977)).
99. Id. at 133. This statement does not amount to a blanket holding that the antitrust laws do not
preempt state economic regulations. Rather, it follows from, and is consistent with, the Court's holding on the
Commerce Clause issue.
100. Parker, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In cases where the Court denied immunity, which typically
involved resale price maintenance systems, the analysis concerned whether the conduct of private parties bore a
sufficient relation to state regulatory policy to warrant such immunity. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) (state may not immunize private action that violates antitrust laws merely
by authorizing that action); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 98
(1980) ('The national policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state
involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement."). While the Court in Midcal at least
noted the national procompetitive policy embodied in the Sherman Act, the outcome would have been different
had there been "active" supervision by the state. Under a Commerce/Supremacy Clause balancing test, the
Court still would have weighed the conflicting interests, rather than relying exclusively on the Parker state
action formula.
101. 48 F.3d 701 (3d Cir. 1995).
102. Id. at710.

Constitutional Limitations
Unlike the Atlantic Coast court, the court in Pine Ridge Recycling, Inc. v.
Butts County1 03 did make an express connection between the Sherman
Act/preemption issue and the Commerce Clause. In Pine Ridge, a municipal
solid waste landfill developer filed an action against the county, its
commissioners, and its solid waste management authority for allegedly
obstructive conduct in the plaintiff's efforts to obtain a landfill permit. 104 The
defendants contended that the state action immunity doctrine shielded their
conduct from liability. Rejecting the defendants' assertion of antitrust
immunity, the court held that the State of Georgia "cannot
grant its local
05
governments the authority to violate the Commerce Clause."'
Citing Carbone in connection with the limitations the Commerce Clause
places on local government regulation of the solid waste processing markets,
the court observed that Carbone also was instructive with respect to the
plaintiffs antitrust claim. By excluding the plaintiff from the local solid
waste disposal market, the court held, the Georgia statute conflicted with the
Commerce Clause, as in Carbone. Accordingly, taking a restrictive view of
the state's authority, the court concluded
that the defendant's conduct was not
06
entitled to state action immunity.'
Under Pine Ridge, if state action results in a violation of the Commerce
Clause, the state and its agents "implementing" the policy are deprived of
Parkerstate action immunity, at least insofar as the state purports to delegate
authority to local governments to adopt anticompetitive programs. The court
also reaffirmed the principle from Carbone that the article of interstate
commerce is not the waste itself, but the processing and disposal of it.'1 7
Courts should adopt the reasoning in Pine Ridge in deflecting claims for
Parkerimmunity. By acknowledging the connection between the preemption
and Commerce Clause analyses, the Pine Ridge court has offered a helpful
analytical method for resolving certain aspects of challenges to
anticompetitive state and local solid waste management schemes. However,
one important component of the inquiry in cases addressing the interplay
among RCRA, the Sherman Act, and the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses
was not addressed in Pine Ridge-the role of the market participant doctrine
in resolving these disputes.

103. 855 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
104. City officials actually invited the lawsuit by publicly stating their intention to construct a
municipally run solid waste landfill without competition. The plaintiff drafted its complaint based largely upon
the City's public statements and underlying intentions. Telephone Interview with Stephen E. O'Day, Esq.,
attorney for plaintiff in Pine Ridge (Feb. 2, 1995).
105. Pine Ridge, 855 F. Supp. at 1271.
106. Id.
107.

d. at 1275
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IV. The Market Participant Doctrine and the Future of Challenges to
Anticompetitive Solid Waste Management Programs
A. Legal and Conceptual Foundations of the Market ParticipantDoctrine
The distinction between governmental and non-governmental acts alluded
to in Parkerlies at the heart of the controversial market participant doctrine.
The market participant doctrine is a jurisprudential tool for determining the
circumstances under which state actions will be subject to federal authority.
While a state may not discriminate through regulations amounting to
economic protectionism favoring local interests, the doctrine exempts from
the scope of the Commerce Clause state actions as a "market participant" in
the manufacture and sale of products, the provision of subsidized services,
and the procurement of products. As the Court stated when it first embraced
the doctrine, "[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause
prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in
the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others."1 °8
The market participant doctrine's principal concern is whether state
"market participation" is truly analogous to that of private companies. The
Supreme Court endorsed the market participant doctrine in a series of
landmark cases beginning 30 years after Parker.19 In South-Central Timber
Development v. Wunnicke," 0 the Court established the outer limit of the
doctrine by rejecting Alaska's attempt to reach beyond the timber market in
which it was a seller/participant by requiring in-state processing of timber by
the purchasers. Concluding that the state's sales amounted to a regulatory
measure that was inconsistent with its status as a market participant, the
Court stated:
The limit of the market-participant doctrine must be that it allows a
State to impose burdens on commerce within the market in which it
is a participant ....[T]he State may not impose conditions, whether

by statute, regulation, or contract, that have a substantial regulatory
effect outside of that particular market."'

108. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
109. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 214-15 (1983)
(sustaining executive order requiring at least one-half staffing of city-funded public works construction projects
with city residents); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 446 (1980) (rejecting challenge to preferences
afforded in-state residents in sale of government-produced cement); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426
U.S. 794, 814 (1976) (upholding state program providing payments for auto scrap where payments restricted
to in-state processors for state-titled vehicles).
110. 467 U.S. 82(1984).
11. Id. at 99 (emphasis added).
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B. The Market Participant Doctrine in the Solid Waste Management
Context
Prior to Congress' recognition of the dangers that prompted the adoption
of legislation addressing it as a national problem, solid waste collection and
disposal had been handled at the local level. This tradition may have
prompted the deference that courts have given12 to notions of state sovereignty
when deciding federalism issues in this area."
Under the market participant doctrine, a state or municipality that acts as
a market participant rather than a market regulator "is not subject to the
restraints of the Commerce Clause."" 3 Distinguishing between a state's
regulation of a market and its involvement as a market participant is
particularly problematic with respect to solid waste management programs,
which typically include market participation within a larger regulatory
program, such as choosing with whom a state-operated landfill will do
business. 114 The Supreme Court has yet to address the applicability of the
doctrine to government-owned waste facilities with respect to either
discriminatory practices under the dormant
Commerce Clause or
5
anticompetitive effects under antitrust law."
In the solid waste management context, the Third Circuit held in Swin
Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County" 6 that a county was acting as a
market participant in attempting to preserve its landfill's capacity for local
residents by charging a higher price to dispose of distant waste in the landfill7
and limiting the volume of distant waste that the landfill would accept."
Distinguishing the outcome in Wunnicke, the court concluded that Lycoming
County's alleged market participation was contained
only in rules concerning the price and volume conditions under which
persons may use the disposal service that Lycoming itself offers. In
setting these price and volume conditions, Lycoming has not crossed the
line that Alaska crossed [in Wunnicke] when that state attempted to
regulate the timber processing market by conditioning its timber sales
112.

See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1694 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting).

See also U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REsouRcE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY Acr,
SUBTrrE D STUDY: PHASE I REPORT, tbL 4-2 (1986) ("[Tradition as well as state and federal law recognize

[waste disposal] as the domain of local
government... today 78 percent of landfills receiving municipal solid
waste are owned by local governments.").
113. Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting White
v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 208 (1983)).
114. See generally William A. Kovacs & Anthony A. Anderson, States as Market Participantsin
Solid Waste Disposal Services-Fair Competition or the Destruction of the Private Sector?, 18 ENVTL L.
779 (1988) (explaining difficulty of separating state roles as market participant and market regulator and urging
closer judicial scrutiny of competitive aspects of state's activities in open market to ensure equal economic
footing for private sector competitors).
115. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 n.6 (1978).
116. 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989).
117. Id. at 249.
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on guarantees that the purchasers would act in a certain way in a
downstream market. The price and volume conditions to which Swin
objects do not pertain to the operation of private landfills and do not
apply beyond
the immediate market in which Lycoming transacts
8
business."
Other courts have upheld the market participant defense to immunize
flow control ordinances from Commerce Clause scrutiny." 9 Like Swin
Resources, however, each of these cases concerned factual scenarios in which
the favored disposal site was directly owned and operated by 20the municipality
whose actions were challenged under the Commerce Clause.'
Several courts have rejected cities' attempts to assert the market
participant defense. In Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Southeast Alabama Solid
Waste Disposal Authority,121 private carting companies challenged municipal
contracts and flow control ordinances that required solid waste collected
within the cities to be delivered to a public waste disposal site owned and
operated by the Alabama Solid Waste Disposal Authority, The court rejected
the cities' market participant defense, holding that because the flow control
ordinances authorized the cities to threaten civil enforcement and
misdemeanor penalties against violators, the 22cities were acting as regulators
and not as private participants in the market.
The Court's decision in Carbone provides a credible basis for arguing
that the exercise of regulatory power within the same market would also
compromise the state's status as a market participant. In determining that a
flow control ordinance requiring all solid waste to be processed at a
designated transfer station before leaving the municipality violated the
Commerce Clause, the Court stated that "having elected to use the open
market to earn revenues for its project, the town may not employ
discriminatory regulation to give that project an advantage over rival
businesses from out of State."'' 23 Clarkstown was financing the facility
(indeed, with tipping fees that the flow control ordinance was intended to

118.

Id. at 250.

119. See LeFrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987); Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc. v.
Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127 (D. Or. 1986); Shayne Bros., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 592 F.
Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1984).
120. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 34-35, SSC Corp. v. Smithtown, 66 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1995)
(No. 94-9192). But see GSW, Inc. v. Long County, 999 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1993) (denying market
participant status to county because flow control ordinance required that solid waste be sent to landfill wholly
owned by private company).
121. 814 F. Supp. 1566 (M.D. Ala. 1993).
122. Ud at 1573. See also Empire Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 645 A.2d 413 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1994) (county that adopted flow control ordinances acting as market regulator).
123. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 114 S.Ct. 1677, 1684 (1994). The town did not claim to be
a market participant, which would have enabled it to avoid the Commerce Clause, apparently because at the
time of the litigation a local private contractor was operating the facility.
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ensure) and agreed to assume control of the facility within five years of its
construction by "buying" it for one dollar.
In his dissent in Carbone, Justice Souter argued that the town's flow
control ordinance did not amount to the kind of economic protectionism
prohibited by the dormant Commerce Clause, precisely because the law
"bestow[ed] no benefit on a class of private actors, but instead directly
aid[ed] the government in satisfying a traditional governmental
responsibility."' 24 Justice Souter's description of the town's actions both
evokes the market participant doctrine and highlights the difficulty of
distinguishing market participation from market regulation.
In criticizing the majority's failure to distinguish between public and
private enterprises, Justice Souter appears to argue that the government's
exercise of regulatory authority for its own benefit in the market is only an
incidental burden on interstate commerce, and is permissible as long as it
satisfies the Pike 125 balancing test. Justice Souter stated:
The local government itself occupies a very different market position,
however, being the one entity that enters the market to serve the public
interest of local citizens quite apart from private interest in private gain.
Reasons other than economic protectionism are accordingly more likely
to explain
the design and effect of an ordinance that favors a public
126
facility.

Since Carbone, federal courts have continued to grapple with the market
participant doctrine in the solid waste management context. For instance, in
Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders
of Atlantic County,' 27 the Third Circuit invalidated New Jersey's regulatory
waste flow scheme, which required that residual waste from mixed waste
loads be returned to the designated district facility unless the facility was
compensated for lost revenue. The court held that the waste flow scheme
discriminated against interstate commerce and was subject to strict scrutiny
under the dormant Commerce Clause. 128 Relying on Swin Resources,129 the
court reaffirmed the market participant concept, but concluded that the
doctrine does not provide an automatic exemption from the dormant
Commerce Clause for state waste flow regulations, even when states purport
to act as market participants.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id at 1692.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1697 (1994).
Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 48 F.3d 701 (3d

Cir. 1995).
128. Id. at 249.
129. Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1077 (1990) (sustaining higher disposal fee at county-operated landfill for non-county waste against
Commerce Clause challenge on grounds that county was "deciding the conditions under which [a private waste
processor] could use [the public] landfill").
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In Atlantic Coast, the state's operation of the solid waste facilities was
subject to Commerce Clause scrutiny because the state attempted to control
the activities of other private market participants, rather than merely the
manner in which the facilities would be operated or with whom they would
deal.13° Thus, by limiting the doctrine within the market in which the state
participates when it attempts to gain an advantage by regulating other market
participants' activities, the Third Circuit went further than the Supreme Court
in Wunnicke. This outcome is consistent with the rationale of Carbone.
C. The SSC CorporationDecision
The most important case in the context of challenges to anticompetitive
state and local solid waste management schemes was the Second Circuit's
decision in SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown. 131 SSC brings together many of
the themes discussed in this Article. Within the same decision, the court
correctly applied, and then misapplied, the market participant doctrine.
In SSC, the towns of Smithtown and Huntington entered into a municipal
32
agreement to provide joint waste disposal service for the towns' residents.1
The scheme was implemented, in part, through contractual arrangements with
haulers. The hauling contracts incorporated by reference a Smithtown flowcontrol ordinance requiring all local residential
waste to go to the town's
33
designated facility in the town of Huntington.'
The case involved the SSC Corporation's alleged breach of contract
through its diversion of waste to out-of-state landfills with lower tipping fees.
SSC contended that the hauling contract was unenforceable because it
violated the Commerce Clause.' 34 In response, the towns attempted to extend
the Parkerstate action immunity doctrine. The towns contended that because
they were acting as "market participants" in the solid waste disposal scheme,
the flow control ordinance and the hauling contracts should not be subject to
35
the Carbone Commerce Clause analysis.'
Unlike the town of Clarkstown in Carbone, however, the SSC
municipalities actively operated the facility and assumed the financial risk of
the solid waste disposal operation. Only a small portion of the tipping fees
collected were to be used to finance the facility, which was funded largely

130. Id. at 712-13.
131. 66 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 911(1996). On the same day that it issued its
decision in SSC, the Second Circuit decided a companion case that addressed Commerce Clause and market
participant issues in the context of a challenge to a waste management plan adopted by the Town of Babylon.
See USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272 (2d Cir. 1995).
132. See SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 506.
133. See id. at 507.
134. See id. at 508.
135. Seeid. at512.
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through general tax revenue.' 36 In support of their alleged market participant
status, the towns argued that "all monopolists are necessarily participants in
the market they monopolize." 137 The Second Circuit rejected the town's
market participant argument, concluding that the flow control ordinance
"constitutes a 'regulation' of the waste disposal market, rather than
' 38
participation in that market.'
In SSC, the Second Circuit reaffirmed the principle that a state or local
government's actions constitute market participation only if a private party
could have engaged in the same actions. 39 Like the Waste Recycling case, the
flow control ordinance in SSC threatened garbage haulers with criminal
prosecution if the haulers failed to do business with the town of Smithtown at
the Huntington incinerator. 14° The court concluded that "[n]o private
company in the open market could force others to buy its services under pain
of criminal penalties. ' 41 The court went on to conclude that the ordinance at
issue was indistinguishable from the one struck down in Carbone 42and
therefore held that the ordinance violated the dormant Commerce Clause."
The decision in SSC has far-reaching ramifications. Its effects will be felt
immediately on Long Island, where several other municipalities have invested
money in solid waste disposal technology under programs similar to the
scheme reviewed in SSC.1 43 Amicus briefs were filed in SSC by haulers who
were plaintiffs in other then-pending cases on Long Island. 1 Beyond its
effects on Long Island, the decision has troubling implications for the future
of this area of the law. The court's invalidation under the dormant Commerce
Clause of the flow control ordinance is consistent with Carbone and a number
of other cases."45 However, the court's conclusion that the town acted as a
market participant (whose actions are not subject to Commerce Clause
limitations) in contracting for waste disposal services in fulfillment of the
136. Telephone interview with James Joyce, Esq., attorney for the Town of Smithtown in SSC (Mar.
15, 1995).
137. Brief of Defendants at 33, SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown, 66 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1995) (No.
94-9192).
138. SSC, 66 F.3d at 513.
139. Id.
at 512. See also Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992).
140. Id at512.
141. Id.
142. Id at514.
143. Telephone Interview with James Joyce, Esq.,
Attorney fortheTown of Smithtown inSSC (Mar.
15, 1995).
144. Id
145. In the only case analyzing the SSC decision to date, the Second Circuit, in Gary D. Peake
Excavating Inc. v. Town Board of Hancock, 93 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1996), held that Carbone and SSC did not
apply to the facts at issue. Peake Excavating involved a challenge to a town law that prohibited the disposal of
any waste in the town, except at the town-operated transfer station. Unlike the ordinances in Carbone and
SSC, which required all waste within the town to be disposed of at a town-designated facility to the exclusion
of out-of-state competitors, the ordinance in Peake Excavating did not prevent town residents from disposing
of waste at any out-of-town facility and did not deny out-of-town competitors access to the town's waste
market. Id at 75. Thus, the local law in Peake Excavating did not raise the antitrust and dormant Commerce
Clause concerns that were present in Carboneand SSC Corp.
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objectives of the flow control ordinance is inconsistent with its ruling on the
flow control ordinance and sets a bad precedent.
The court's holding regarding the waste hauling contracts at issue in SSC
allows the town to "have it both ways" by simultaneously escaping Carbone
Commerce Clause scrutiny and enjoying antitrust immunity. 146 Inessence,
what the court precluded the town from pursuing on a broad scale in the form
of the flow control ordinance, it enabled the town to undertake on a
cumulative, piecemeal basis in the form of the waste hauling contracts. The
SSC decision could send a dangerous message to municipalities in the solid
waste management field by encouraging them to enter into waste hauling
contracts with individual private contractors as market participants to achieve
anticompetitive results. This would allow them to make an "end run" around
what they otherwise would be prohibited from achieving as market regulators.
Conclusion
The enactment of RCRA and the expansion of the scope of interstate
commerce have nationalized solid waste management, a field that was
formerly the exclusive domain of state and local governments. Among the
economic safeguards for those now participating in the solid waste
management field are the Sherman Act, the Commerce Clause, and the
Supremacy Clause. Courts evaluating challenges to anticompetitive state and
local solid waste management schemes must consider the delicate and often
confusing interplay among RCRA, the Sherman Act, and the Commerce and
Supremacy Clauses.
Consistent with Justice Marshall's proclamation that antitrust laws in
general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the "Magna Carta of free
enterprise,"'' 47 state and local governments may limit the role of private
market participants in the solid waste management field only in a manner that
does not obstruct the Sherman Act's objectives. In determining whether, and
to what extent, state and local governments may limit competition in the solid
waste management market, courts must also consider possible burdens on
interstate commerce imposed by solid waste management schemes. This
should be done by balancing the anticompetitive burdens imposed on
interstate commerce against the purely local state interest advanced by the law
or regulation.
Flow control ordinances, the importation and exportation of waste, and
tipping fees have blurred the roles of state and local governments in the solid
146. Telephone Interview with William L. Kovacs, Esq. (Feb. 14, 1995). Mr. Kovacs, a partner in the
Washington, D.C. office of Eckert, Seamans, Cherin & Mellott, was the Chief Counsel for the U.S. House of
Representatives Subcommittee on Transportation and Commerce during the development and enactment of
RCRA in 1976.
147. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
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waste management context. The traditional line of demarcation between
acting as a market participant and serving as a market regulator is no longer
clear. Understanding the market participant doctrine in the solid waste
management context is essential to clarifying issues and resolving
controversies in this area of the law. This Article suggests that if a court
determines that a governmental entity is acting as a market participant in a
solid waste management scheme, it should subject that entity to possible
antitrust liability for its alleged anticompetitive conduct, as in Pine Ridge.
Otherwise, state and local governments could evade Commerce Clause
problems and antitrust liability while undertaking anticompetitive regulatory
schemes that achieve anticompetitive effects similar to those created by the
flow control ordinances that were invalidated in many of the cases discussed
in this Article.
The amorphous nature of government regulation in the modem solid
waste management arena undoubtedly contributed to the Second Circuit's
misapplication of the market participant doctrine and its poorly reasoned and
potentially dangerous decision in SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown. Courts
should realize that both the Sherman Act and the dormant Commerce Clause
revolve around the effects of state and local government action on interstate
commerce and the national economy. If courts recognize this necessary
connection, they may preclude governmental entities from using the Parker
state action immunity doctrine to engage in economic protectionism that
violates the dormant Commerce Clause.

